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Abstract—Dynamic spectrum access is an important way to
alleviate the spectrum scarcity. Traditionally, secondary users
are allowed to opportunistically operate when primary users
are absent and buy idle bands from primary users. Although
it improves the spectrum utility to some extents, it is not
enough. In this paper, we argue that spectrum hole should be
endogenous which means they should be negotiated by primary
and secondary users. We proposed a novel spectrum sharing
scheme with spectrum usage and management right. Further, we
suggest spectrum trading as a financial option to capture the
realistic usage and increase the trading flexibility. We show the
superior of our model for primary users in deterministic and
dynamic leasing environments.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid proliferation of various forms of mobile devices,
coupled with the expansion of wireless Internet services,
brought to the forefront the limitations of the static command
and control approach to spectrum management. Exclusive
access to rigidly partitioned bands of the spectrum has suc-
ceeded in ensuring predictable, interference-free access to
the wireless medium. The licensing of the spectrum bands
for extended periods of time over large geographical areas,
however, resulted in unlicensed bands being severely con-
gested, while large portions of licensed spectrum lie unused,
despite the soaring demand for wireless broadband. To address
the apparent spectrum scarcity, dynamic spectrum allocation
(DSA) was proposed as an alternative to fixed allocation. DSA
enables dynamic spectrum sharing, in time and space, thereby
providing the flexibility needed to respond to temporal and
spatial variations of traffic statistics and bandwidth require-
ments of different services [1].
Two types of spectrum sharing schemes exist in DSA,
opportunistic and cooperative spectrum sharing. Opportunistic
sharing that enabled by sensing and programmable transmitters
was the dominant approach in the past. The intense research in
opportunistic sharing has led to several schemes for efficient
spectrum management and allocation. However, most of them
use questionable assumptions that limit their applicability in
a real settings. For example, spectrum holes are considered
to be exogenous, assumed to occur through some phenomena
the secondary users (SUs) can neither control or anticipate.
Furthermore, spectrum exogeneity assumes that primary users’
(PUs) behavior is invariant to the presence of SUs. This may
be an unrealistic assumption [2].
An alternative to opportunistic sharing is the more
economically-centric approach, cooperative sharing. The ker-
nel of cooperative sharing is explicit bargaining over spectrum
usage rights, e.g. spectrum trading in the secondary spectrum
market. The majority of research work in spectrum trading
uses game theoretic and auction based approaches. Game
theoretic approaches are targeted at finding the best strategies
(Nash equilibrium or Pareto Optimality) that maximize the
utilities of PUs and SUs in different scenarios [3] [4] [5].
Auction based research views spectrum as a divisible good
and studies auction mechanisms to allocate these goods to
achieve an optimal allocation. “Optimal” may imply optimality
for PUs, SUs, and social welfare [6] [7]. The major limitation
for this research is that they assume spectrum trading only
takes place on PUs’ idle bands. In other words, although SUs
have higher QoS and PUs earn revenue through trading, SUs’
still do not have control of the spectrum holes. Moreover,
these schemes do not provide enough flexibility to manage
risk while creating incentives.
In cooperative sharing, spectrum holes are explicitly en-
dogenous. These holes are created as the result of bilateral
bargaining on the part PUs and SUs, or they may occur through
a broker or a transaction in a spectrum market. It is often
the case, however, due to the variability of user traffic load
and requirements, that it is difficult for PUs to accurately
estimate the amount of endogenous spectrum that could be
leased to SUs, without inadvertently limiting their ability to
meet future needs. This, in turn, leads to conservative PU
leasing strategies, thereby reducing the amount of leasable
spectrum.
To address these shortcomings and challenges, we propose
a framework for coopetition to foster collaboration among
PUs and SUs, while allowing competition. The coopetition
framework ensures the spectrum is allocated to those who
value it the most. In order to achieve this goal, spectrum
bands are separated into two different blocks, called spectrum
management right and spectrum usage right. When SUs buy
the management right, they fully control the spectrum for the
entire period of time. On the other hand, if SUs buy spectrum
usage right, they have to follow PUs’ sharing etiquette and
PUs have the right to revoke the spectrum if needed. Both
rights are traded as financial options. More specifically, our
framework ensures the following:
1) creation of endogenous spectrum holes to augment those
vacated when PUs become idle;
2) combine exogenous and endogenous spectrum holes and
provide opportunities for spectrum usage that go beyond
what is currently possible through current spectrum
sharing schemes;
3) incentivize PUs to engage an measured risk taking spec-
trum sharing approach while offering them opportunities
to revoke spectrum when needed.
4) support put and call options to provide flexibility to
PUs and SUs in trading endogenous spectrum holes to
achieve effective spectrum sharing.
Two cases are analyzed in this paper, static spectrum al-
location and dynamic spectrum allocation. It is shown that
the proposed model provides at least the same profits as the
current spectrum trading model where PUs only sell idle bands
and it is superior in most of the cases. Three types of risk
functions and two types of penalty functions are implemented
for sensitivity analysis. Spectrum strategies that lead to higher
profits are determined for each case as well.
To the best of our knowledge, the proposed coopetition
framework is the first model that allows PUs and SUs to
cooperate with each other while compete in the same group.
The endogenous spectrum hole that created by this model will
benefit spectrum trading and utilization, since it offers PUs a
chance to compare the gain via spectrum leasing and their
own services. It also provides SUs an opportunity to demand
exactly what they want. It is likely that these two aspects will
increase the market liquidity to some extent, though we do
not study that here. An additional contribution of htis paper
is to allow the trading of different spectrum rights and allow
the revocation of usage rights, which mitigates the risks of
spectrum trading and should increase the tradeable channels.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the coopetition framework we proposed. Section
III is the system model with utility functions. Section IV
provides evaluations. Finally, Section V concludes the paper
and discusses future research.
II. COOPETITION FRAMEWORK
Without loss of generality, we assume that at any point of
time, PUs have a minimum requirement for the number of
wireless channels they need to provide services and additional
channels for potential demand. PUs should be encouraged
to create more (endogenous) spectrum holes since it brings
higher spectrum leasing fees for PUs and more spectrum
access opportunities for SUs. Though it optimizes spectrum
utilization, there are risks associated with this action as well.
For example, extra service demand that may happen in the
future cannot be predicted now. In order to mitigate the
potential risks and uncertainties, we propose a novel spectrum
sharing structure with two types of spectrum rights: a spectrum
usage right and a spectrum management right.
As shown in Fig.1, the entire licensed band for s PU
is separated into three parts: exclusive usage for PUs (E),
spectrum usage right for SUs (U ), and spectrum management
right for SUs (M ). E is reserved for the PU’s wireless services
and can not be accessed by any other spectrum users. The
PU gives up spectrum management rights in M , so the SUs
in M have full control of the resource. They can allow
other spectrum users to access based on the spectrum sharing
etiquette they designed. This works the same as when PUs
only sell idle bands. The risk taking is embodied in spectrum
usage right. In U , PUs still have the right of management and
SUs have the right to operate in accordance with the PU’s
requirements. Basically, PUs have two actions in U . They can
share the spectrum with SUs or revoke the spectrum from SUs’
usage.
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Fig. 1. Spectrum Structure.
This spectrum sharing structure is in line with PCAST report
which suggests the President to open federal frequency bands
for three-tier hierarchical sharing. In which, federal system
have the highest priority and are protected from harmful
interference. Two types of sharing exists, one with higher QoS
and the other one is based on best effort.
Both spectrum usage right and spectrum management right
are traded in the spectrum market as financial options through
Vickrey auction. Spectrum management right is more expen-
sive than spectrum usage right, since it has less risks and
uncertainties.
A. Spectrum usage right
The spectrum usage right works as a revocable lease. PUs
grant SUs the right to access the specified spectrum for a
period of time. At any point during this interval, the PU can
revoke the spectrum usage right; they may do so to provide
higher QoS to their own users or cope with a traffic burst. They
do so by sending a specified signal to the SU. In contrast to the
spectrum management right, the spectrum usage right promises
PUs the control over the frequency bands during the spectrum
sharing. This action ensures PUs’ high priority and mitigates
the negative impact of spectrum sharing by allowing PUs to
react promptly to variations in usage demand. Therefore, it
encourages PUs to increase the spectrum supply.
SUs with U , on the other hand, have clear understanding
that they have to terminate their service when the spectrum is
recalled. This is a significant uncertainty for their operation.
In order to protect the SUs’ investment, a penalty function
is implemented. The penalty is paid by PUs whenever they
revoke the spectrum to the SUs whose service have been
influenced. The guideline to design the penalty function is
to: (1) deter PUs’ abuse in revocation; (2) prevent SUs from
holding the spectrum and waiting for the compensation.
B. Spectrum trading as financial option
A financial option is a derivative instrument for a future
transaction on an asset, such as stock, bond, etc. The essence
for option trading is to purchase the right to buy/sell the
actual assets in the future. There are three components of
options: premium, expiration date, and strike price. The buyer
of options pay the seller a premium in order to have the right
but not obligation to purchase/sell (depends on the option type)
the asset at the strike price before the expiration date. The
seller of the option has the obligation to sell/purchase the asset
if it is requested by the buyer of the option. There are two types
of financial option, call and put. Entities that estimate the asset
that may decrease in value will write a call option (short call),
which may require them to sell the asset at the strike price. The
long call (buyer) has the right but not obligation to purchase
the asset. Parties that anticipate the asset may increase in value
will write an put option (short put), which means they may
have to buy the asset at the strike price. The long put (buyer)
has the right but not obligation to sell the asset.
The primary advantage of an option is that it helps mitigate
risks and uncertainties in the future, since the buyer of options
does not have the obligation to buy/sell the asset. In other
words, if the value of the asset decreases, the long call will not
exercise their option (ii.e., buy the asset) and their only loss is
the premium and not the decrease in asset value. We adopt the
option method since spectrum users also have uncertainties in
the future usage of spectrum due to the nature of burst traffic
and unpredictable demands. Furthermore the U bands defined
above behave similarly to options.
In determining spectrum contracts in U , PUs write an call
option as [premium, spectrum cost, start time, finish time,
frequency bands]. Likewise, SUs write a put option in order
to buy spectrum according to the same matrix. The premium
is the same as the one in financial area, and is a sunk cost
for option buyer. Spectrum cost is analogous to the strike
price, which determines the asset cost. Start time is the time
for operation to start and it is the expiration time for the
option. For example, if the SUs do not pay the spectrum
cost before start time, the call option expired and PUs collect
the premium. Ending time is used to determine the duration
of operation. There can be more specification for spectrum
other than frequency bands, such as power density, spectrum
mask and so on. We choose minimum number of indicators
to simplify the model.
One condition on applying options is that the underlying
market should be liquid. In [8], the authors find that viable
spectrum markets must have sufficient participants (> 6)
and the spectrum supply must be roughly balanced to the
demand. [9] points out that two steps are needed for market
liquidity. The first one is to involve federal frequency into
spectrum market. The second one is that call option should be
incorporated in trading asset. In this paper, we assume multi-
buyer and -seller with large number of chunks of spectrum,
and the market liquidity is achieved.
C. Auction
We implement our mechanisms in a multi-unit Vickrey
(second price) auction, since it is an efficient method to
enhance competition within groups and allocate the resource to
whom values it the most. Bidders are ranked by their proposed
spectrum price and spectrum is allocated from higher rank to
lower ones. The payment is determined by the losing bids
in order. For example, the winner of the first band will pay
the highest losing bid. It is proven that bidders do not have
incentives to manipulate in Vickrey auction.
Without losing generality, we assume that channels owned
by the same PU provide the same physical characteristics
(bandwidth, carrier frequency, modulation schemes, etc.),
whereas channels from different PUs have various features.
For example, the carrier frequency and bandwidth for TV
channels are 700MHz and 6KHz, and for GSM-based PUs
are 900MHzor1800MHz and 200KHz, respectively [10].
Therefore, we assumes that SUs set different base value for
different PUs’ frequency bands, which depends on service type
and technology. This value is a non-decreasing function for
each individual PU’s supply.
D. Trading procedures
The basic tenet of this framework is spectrum trading. In
every spectrum trading epoch, both PUs and SUs can initiate
the spectrum trading by writing an option. Options provide
the flexibility to determine whether the buyer wants to start
the trading or not. However, the option does not provide any
flexibility after the trading begins. This problem is solved by
spectrum usage right.
If SUs and PUs agree on a put option, PUs have two
decisions to make: before the start time, they can choose
whether to start the trading or not; during the operation, they
have the opportunity to revoke the spectrum in U . If SUs and
PUs agree on a call option, PUs do not have the choice to
drop the trading if SUs exercise the option, but they can still
revoke the spectrum in U .
Option 
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Start 
time
Finish 
time
PUs operation on E exclusively 
PUs can revoke spectrum in U
PUs abandon the spectrum management right in M.
SUs start put option, PUs 
determine exercise or not.  
PUs start call option, SUs 
determine exercise or not.   
Fig. 2. Spectrum Structure.
We assume that the objective for both PUs and SUs is to
maximize their utilities which will introduced in section III.
The spectrum structure is not determine by PUs only. It is
resulted from SUs’ offer and PUs’ spectrum utilization. More
specifically, when SUs provide a high spectrum leasing fee,
PUs may sell the spectrum management right even if they have
demand on those bands. It is the case when PUs’ service loss
is less than the leasing gain.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A. PUs’ Decision in Two Cases
We consider a heterogeneous network consisting of n PUs,
and m SUs. In this paper, we focus on PUs’ utility functions
and behaviors. We assume that there are many SUs that initiate
put options, each with a different spectrum demand curve. PUs
compare the utility if they lease the spectrum, Up, with the
expected spectrum value without leasing, Vp, and choose the
option that gives the highest profits.
We will model two cases for PUs. In the first case, PUs
deterministically specify the quantity of reserved and ded-
icated leasing bands. The reserved band is set to satisfy
minimum service requirement and the dedicated leasing bands
is the idle bands. Therefore, the revenue in revocable leasing
bands is superior to exogenous spectrum holes. Let BRp equal
the number of channels in the revocable leasing bands. The
expected value of spectrum without leasing is calculated as
V Rp = 
R
p (B
R
p ; Te). Te is the lease duration, and 
R
p is the
unit.
The expected utility of spectrum leasing in revocable spec-
trum bands is an optimization problem for PUs, since they can
balance the potential gain with risks.
maximize URp (b) (1)
subject to
P
brs  BRp (2)
brs  0 (3)
URp (b) is calculated as
URp (b) =
X
s2S
RRp (b
r
s; Te) 
X
s2S
Z Te
0
((PRp (b
r
s; t) 
Rp (b
r
s; (Te   t)) Rp (brs; t)dt
(4)
where, S is the set of secondary users, s 2 S acquires
spectrum brs 2 BRp from user p. RRp (brs; Te) is the revenue
to be collected by PU p from SU s for revocable lease brs
over time [0; Te]. This is a non decreasing function that is
determined by SUs according to their demands. When brs = 0,
RRp (b
r
s; Te) = 0. P
R
p (b
r
s; t) is the penalty incurred by user
p for revoking brs at time t. 
R
p (b
r
s; (Te   t) is the extra
gain provided by revocation. Rp (b
r
s; t) is the probability of
revocation occurred. The second
P
calculates the expected
utility from revocation.
In the second case, the spectrum allocation is even more
dynamic. PUs only determine the reserved bands and optimize
the number of channels in revocable lease (BRp ) and dedicated
lease (BLp ) based on SUs’ spectrum offer and estimated risks.
In other words, when SUs’ offer is high, PUs will lease more
dedicated bands than just idle bands. The expected value of
spectrum without leasing in this case includes value from both
dedicated and revocable leasing bands, V ap = 
a
p(B
a
p ; Te).
The expected utility for leasing the spectrum for secondary
usage can be optimized as
maximize Up(BRp ; B
L
p ; (b
r
s; b
l
s)s2S ; Te) (5)
subject to bis  0; i = r; l (6)P
s2S b
r
s  BRp (7)P
s2S b
l
s  BLp (8)
BRp +B
L
p = B
a
p (9)
Up(B
R
p ; B
L
p ; (b
r
s; b
l
s)s2S ; Te) is the utility for PU p in the
second case. It is depends on the total number of available
spectrum (Bap = B
R
p + B
L
p ) and its allocation, SUs’ demand
quantity (brs; b
l
s) and proposed prices.
Up =
X
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l
s; Te) 
X
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Lp (b
l
s; Te) +
X
s2S
RRp (b
r
s; Te)
 
X
s2S
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0
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r
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(10)
where, bis is the number of channels that SU s bought from
revocable lease r or dedicated lease l. RLp (b
l
s; Te) is the
revenue collected by PU P from SU s for dedicated leasing
band bls over time Te. Since PUs cannot revoke spectrum in
the dedicated leasing band, they will lose the potential revenue
if there is demand. Lp (b
l
s; Te) captures the potential demand
for PUs in the dedicated leasing band.
B. Risk Function
The risk function reflects PUs’ estimate of potential service
demand. We use three types of distributions to model the risk.
The first risk function follows uniform distribution, which
means the probability potential demand is the same at any
point of time.
R1 =
1
Te
(11)
The second risk function is an exponential distribution. From
the PUs’ perspective, it means that the probability of service
demand decreases with time. In other words, if PUs do not
have service demand now, it is less likely that they will need
the spectrum in the near future.
R2 = e t (12)
The logic behind the third risk function is that the probability
of service demand will increase with time. This line captures
the assumption that the longer the duration, the more likely
that there will be service demand.
R3 = 1  e t (13)
C. Penalty Function
For the sake of brevity, we only consider two types of
penalty functions to demonstrate the impact of penalty func-
tions on a PUs’ decision and utility. There are certainly more
intermediate or more appropriate penalty function for different
services. The variable in penalty function is the revocation time
t. The first type of penalty function is a straight line, where we
assume that the spectrum utility increase with time linearly.
P1 =
P
s2S R
R
p (b
r
s; Te) t
Te
(14)
The reason behind the second type of penalty function is that
since SUs have already use some spectrum, PUs will pay less
than the value of the spectrum.
P2 = (1 +
X
s2S
RRp (b
r
s; Te))
t=Te   1 (15)
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the profits that PUs can gain
in different situations. Three major factors affect the PU’s
decision: spectrum lease duration, penalty function, and the
PUs’ estimated spectrum gain based on their own wireless
services.
A. PUs’ choices in static situation
Fig.3 shows the PUs’ penalties in different risk and penalty
combinations when Te = 2. pirj indicates the combination
of risk and penalty functions. For example, p1r1 means PUs’
estimate of their potential service demand is type R1 and the
penalty that s/he will pay is defined by the penalty function
P1. From this figure we can see that P2 gives less penalty than
P1. R2 gives the smallest penalty since the risk of revoking
spectrum decreases with time. R3 gives the highest penalty
since both the risk and the penalty increase with time. This
figure provides guidance for PUs and SUs to negotiate the
penalty function. The penalty value varies significantly even
with the same risk function. Moreover, accurately estimating
the risk function is important for PUs. In addition, the penalty
enlarges when Te increases, which is shown in Fig.4. Thus,
PUs should shorten the spectrum lease duration when they
cannot foresee the future usage accurately.
The purpose of the second simulation is to show whether
adding spectrum usage rights can bring extra profits in a
static situation, where PUs determine the number of leaseable
channels. In Fig.4, we capture the largest profits for PUs under
18 situations with different combination of risk and penalty
functions when Te = 2; 4; 5 respectively. We assume that there
are 3 channels that have potential usage and can be revocably
leased. The number on each bar shows the number of channels
that lead to the largest profits. It is clear that when penalty
is low, PUs’ profits increase with Te. For example, profits in
p1r2 and p2r2 are always higher than p1r1 and p2r1. However,
when the penalty is high, as is the case with p1r3 and p2r3, the
PU’s profit decreases with lease duration. In some cases, even
selling one channel under revocable leasing results in negative
profits. Therefore, there is no profit to leasing spectrum usage
rights in these situations. PUs could choose to reduce the
spectrum trading period or only lease the idle bands.
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Fig. 3. PUs’ penalty in static assignment.
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Fig. 4. PUs’ profits in static assignment.
B. PUs’ choices in dynamic situation
In this simulation, we assume that there are 3 idle bands and
5 channels have potential usage. PUs dynamically determine
the number of channels under dedicated and revocable lease
terms to maximize their profits. Fig.5 provides the leasing
strategy that results in the highest profit in each situation.
The first digit above each bar is the number of channels in
the dedicated leasing bands, and the second on is the number
of channels in the revocable lease. As shown by the x axis
label, there are five groups with different Te and Eg. Te is
the lease duration, Eg is PUs potential gain if they do not
lease the spectrum. The expected Eg is time dependent since
the wireless service gain is partially related to service time.
Therefore, Eg is proportional to Te.
In Fig.5 we can see that, within each group, it is more
profitable for PUs to lease more revocable bands when the
penalty is low. The reason is that if the penalty is low,
PUs prefer to reserve the bands for their own usage. When
the penalty is higher than the gain from their own services,
they would rather lease them in dedicated bands for higher
spectrum leasing fees.
Next, we compare the strategy and profits across groups.
The first three groups assume the same potential profits and
vary in the lease duration. It is clear that PUs are more
aggressive when lease duration is low, since PUs can estimate
the potential usage more precisely. The estimated potential
usage also impacts the PUs’ strategy and profits. Let us
compare groups 1, 4, 5, where Te = 10 and Eg varies. It
is rational for PUs to be more aggressive in leasing spectrum
in dedicated bands when the potential gain from their own
services is low. In summary, PUs’ strategy and profits are
highly situational: they vary with lease duration, potential gain
from their own services, as well as risk and penalty functions.
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Fig. 5. PUs’ profits in dynamic assignment.
C. Impacts from options
In the above sections, we analyze the profits that PUs can
earn when the trading is successful. As we mentioned before,
spectrum trading may not be successful every time, since the
option buyer does not have the obligation to buy/sell the asset.
Therefore, the expected utility for PUs also depends on the
option type. More specifically, the expected utility for PUs in
a call option is Ucall = (1 )Pre+Up. Where, Pre is
the premium collected by PUs, and  is the rate of successful
trading. PUs pay a premium in a put option, thus the expected
utility for PUs in a put option is Uput = (1   )( Pre) +
 Up.
In Fig.6, we assume the optimum profits 43.5, which we
determined above under the assumption of dynamic trading
with penalty type 1 and risk type 1 and Te = 10; Eg = 0:2Te.
The first letter in the legend indicates the option type (c is
call option and p is put option). The percentage indicates the
amount of premium. For example, 1% means the premium
is one percent of the profits, which is 0.435. It is clear that
call options provide higher expected utility since PUs collect
the premium. When the premium is low, the expected utility
in both options are almost the same. Moreover, the expected
utility increase with the successful trading rate. When the
trading is one hundred percent successful, the expected utility
equals to PUs’ profits.
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Fig. 6. PUs’ expected utility impacted by options.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a coopetition framework which
boost competition within PUs and SUs and encourage coop-
eration between groups to create more endogenous spectrum
holes. We suggest two types of trading: revocable and dedi-
cated leasing. In revocable leasing, PUs can retrieve spectrum
back at any point of time with a penalty. PUs cannot touch
the spectrum in dedicated leasing, so the price is higher in
return. With this mechanism, we encourage PUs to lease more
spectrum and protect SUs’ investment. We show PUs’ profits
in different combination of penalty and risk functions, as well
as PUs’ estimated service gain. We identified the factors that
impact profits and also pointed out situations that leads to
the largest profits. In the future research, we will analyze the
profits and strategies for SUs. Then, we will implement our
mechanisms in agent-based model to capture the interactions
between PUs and SUs.
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